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Abstract—Recent years have seen a significant increase in the
popularity of social networking services. These online services en-
able users to construct groups of contacts, referred to as friends,
with which they can share digital content and communicate.
This sharing is actively encouraged by the social networking
services, with users’ privacy often seen as a secondary concern.
In this paper we first propose a privacy-aware social networking
service and then introduce a collaborative approach to authoring
privacy policies for the service. In addressing user privacy, our
approach takes into account the needs of all parties affected by
the disclosure of information and digital content.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networking sites have enjoyed explosive
growth recently with Facebook1, the most popular site, claim-
ing membership in excess of 400 million users2. Facebook,
and social networking sites in general, enable users to define
groups of friends (other users of the social networking service)
with which they can share information and digital content such
as photographs and videos.
As the business model for many social networking sites
depends on access to large quantities of user data, users
are actively encouraged to upload and share content and
information, often with strangers. This has led to numerous
incidents where personal data available on a social networking
site has been exploited for uses other than it was originally
intended. In several recent cases, people have lost their jobs
due to the posting of inappropriate comments and photographs
on Facebook [1].
To safeguard users’ privacy online, privacy protection mech-
anisms are needed. These mechanisms limit the scope for
attacks on user privacy by ensuring that accesses to a user’s
data are authorized by the user. Existing privacy protection
mechanisms enable users to specify policies for their data.
They do not support cases where disclosure of data affects
several individuals. An example of this is with the sharing of
a photograph of a group of people. Viewers of the photograph
are able to learn information which any one of the individuals
depicted in the photograph may not have wanted disclosed (for
example the individual’s location, activity and who they were
with at a particular time).
1www.facebook.com
2http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
In this paper we present a solution to this problem that
employs a collaborative method for specifying privacy poli-
cies. In our approach, the owner of content is responsible for
uploading it to the social networking site. This owner can then
specify privacy policy for the content. This policy includes
the activation conditions for the policy, the resource it applies
to and also the permissions it grants. The owner can then
nominate a number of friends on the social networking site to
modify the policy activation conditions i.e. change the scope
of the policy. In the remainder of this paper we refer to these
individuals as co-owners of the content. We assume that co-
owners are people that will be affected by the disclosure of
the content.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Related
work in the field is presented in Section II. A model for a
privacy-preserving social network is then presented in Section
III. This is followed by a description of our privacy policy
language in Section IV. We outline a motivational scenario
for the work in Section V before discussing our prototype
implementation in Section VI. A discussion of future work is
then given in Section VII before the paper is concluded in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we present an overview of existing work
in the field of privacy policy. We begin with an overview of
industry approaches, then discuss research work in the field
of social networking and finish with a summary.
A. EPAL
EPAL (the Enterprise Privacy Awareness Language) [2]
is a privacy policy language developed by IBM. As the
name suggests, it is primarily intended for use by enterprise-
level organizations that deal with customer data. The policy
language enables these organizations to specify access and
usage restrictions on the customer data they have collected
(like the time of day a request is made), the purpose to which
the data will be put and any obligations that come with access
to the data (e.g., accessed data must be deleted after a set time
period).
B. XACML
XACML, the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
[3], is an XML-based general access control policy language.
While not explicitly intended for privacy policy specification,
the policy language is sufficiently general to be put to this
purpose. Each XACML policy applies to a target (which
may be subjects, resources, environments or system actions),
contains a set of rules to determine when the policy is
applicable, an algorithm for evaluating these rules and a list
of obligations associated with accessing the target. As with
EPAL, rules can be conditional (e.g., dependent on time of
day, location etc).
C. P3P
The Platform for Privacy Preferences [4], (commonly re-
ferred to as P3P), is a privacy policy language developed by
the W3C to address the privacy needs of web users. Websites
that collect user data describe how the data is collected, what
it will be used for, the retention policy of the website, and
whether gathered data will be disclosed to third-parties. Once
defined, the website’s P3P policy is made publicly available.
Web users define their own data usage policies, using the
APPEL [5] preference language, stating the conditions under
which they are willing to disclose their data. When a user
visits a website with a P3P policy, a P3P agent built into the
user’s web browser compares the website’s P3P policy to the
user’s APPEL policy. The results are displayed to the user,
who then must decide whether or not to release data to the
website.
D. Or Best Offer (OBO)
The OBO approach was developed by Walker et al. [6] to
automate privacy policy negotiation. Their work is intended to
establish a privacy policy acceptable to both the client (user)
and the data collecting service.
In the approach, each type of user data (e.g., telephone
numbers) receives three tags describing: the recipients; the
purposes that the data can be used for (such as marketing);
and the server retention policy. For each of these three tags,
the user defines ‘ideal’, ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ values.
The server similarly defines its privacy policy, but in terms of
the data it wishes to collect.
During the negotiation phase, the user (represented by a
negotiation client) and the server attempt to arrive at a privacy
policy in which the recipient, purpose and retention tags for
all user data types have values that are at least ‘acceptable’ to
both parties.
E. Collaborative Access Control
Carminati et al. [7] developed an access control approach
based on the relationships in the social network between the re-
quester and the content/resource owner. Their work categorizes
all relationships between users in the social network according
to: type, referring to whether the relationship is direct, or
indirect (e.g., parent or friend of a friend); the trust given
to that relationship; and, the distance between the requester
and the owner in the social network graph. This graph is a
commonly used representation of a social network in which
each user appears as a node and friendship relationships are
represented as links between nodes.
Access policies associated with the owner’s resource are
specified using the 3 properties of relationships (type, trust
and depth) described previously. Users of the network are
given signed credentials by the owner certifying their depth,
relationship type and trust level. To access a resource, the
requesting party must demonstrate it holds the necessary
relationship credentials from the resource owner.
F. Lockr
The developers of Lockr, Tootoonchian et al. [8], use
relationships within the social network to specify privacy
policy. In their approach, users store their data inside a Lockr
server. Access to the data is based on authenticated access
to the Lockr with authentication achieved using public key
certificates. Permissions within the Lockr are associated with
public keys. To access data, the requester must be in possession
of a public key with the necessary permissions. Alternatively,
access to data can be gained through attestations - signed
statements from trusted parties proclaiming that the requester
of the data is in a certain kind of relationship (e.g., parent)
with the owner of the data in the Lockr.
G. Collective Privacy Management
Squicciarini et al. [9] developed a collaborative privacy
policy approach specifically for social networks. In their work,
a user specifies privacy policies for her data (e.g., videos
and photographs) in terms of the maximum depth in the
social network graph that the viewer can be. For instance,
a maximum depth of 1 would equate to a direct friend, while
a depth of 2 would mean a friend of a friend.
The approach also makes use of the concept of shared
ownership of data. This is achieved by having the originator
of the data, that is the user responsible for uploading the data,
specify other potential owners of that data. The system then
holds an auction on the possible privacy policy to apply to the
data in which all the owners submit a vote for their desired
policy. The system is designed to reward data originators that
include other owners, and owners that correctly choose the
winning privacy policy. To reduce the frequency of auctions,
the approach includes a learning mechanism that applies
privacy policy to data that are similar (based on a comparison
of tags on the data).
H. Summary
In online social networking environments, where multiple
parties can be affected by disclosure of content, privacy
protection mechanisms are needed to enforce the privacy
of all parties involved. Policy-based approaches offer the
greatest flexibility in these environments but, to the best of our
knowledge, no existing approach is able to establish policy for
a shared resource that respects the privacy requirements of all
users affected by the disclosure of the resource.
Tootoonchian et al. attempt to address the problem of access
control within social networks. However, they focus on policy
specification from the perspective of a single resource owner.
A simple approach to supporting multi-owner policy spec-
ification would be to merge the individual policies of the
resource owners pertaining to the resource to decide if a dis-
closure should be permitted. This would then enable existing
policy languages, such as EPAL and P3P/APPEL, to express
the privacy policy. XACML, while not specifically intended for
privacy policy, is sufficiently general that it can also be put
to this purpose. However, merging policies leaves no room
for negotiation [6]. The need for negotiation is supported
by Spiekermann et al. [10] who found that user’s privacy
requirements are not fixed, and can be downgraded in different
situations or to achieve a desired outcome.
In the Collaborative Access Control approach developed
by Squicciarini et al. co-owners individually propose privacy
policy for their shared resource and then vote on their preferred
policy. The approach acknowledges the need for authors to
collectively decide on the policy for the resource, but offers
limited capacity for negotiation.
The concept of policy negotiation is further explored in
OBO, developed by Walker et al., which enables two parties
to generate a privacy policy that is mutually acceptable. In
a social networking scenario, where a resource potentially
has multiple owners, performing such a complex, multi-stage
negotiation is likely to be infeasible.
III. SOCIAL NETWORK MODEL
In this paper we have not restricted our analysis of the
privacy issues regarding data dissemination to a specific social
networking platform. We have rather opted to specify a set of
features that need to be present in a social network for our
approach to be applicable. These features are:
1) Users are able to add/remove their content on the ser-
vice. Here content refers to video, photographs, status
updates, comments and links.
2) Ownership of content is allocated to the user that up-
loads it to the service.
3) Users can specify a privacy policy for each of the content
items they own.
4) Users can add/remove friends on the service.
5) Users that are friends can view one another’s content as
well as modify it (by adding tags, comments and links).
6) Owners can undo/remove modifications (such as com-
ments) added by friends to their content.
It is interesting to observe that Facebook meets all these
requirements. Therefore, to apply our policy approach to spec-
ifying privacy concerns, Facebook would need to implement
our policy evaluation mechanism and provide a user interface
to author the policies.
IV. PRIVACY POLICY LANGUAGE
In this section we present a simple privacy policy language
that we use as a vehicle for explaining our collaborative policy
authoring approach. As our contributions lie in the method
by which policies are authored, other languages (such as
XACML) could theoretically have been used given suitable
extensions.
In our approach, privacy policies are specified as logic rules
that define a set of permitted actions on a resource for a given
request. The policy language is used for brevity and should
not be considered a contribution of the paper.
Policies are created by an owner (responsible for the re-
source) who manages the policies along with a set of trusted
co-owners. In the remainder of this paper we shall refer to the
owner and the set of co-owners collectively as owners.
Within the policy language, policy conditions are expressed
as first order predicates and can refer to properties of the
request, the resource and the owners. All conditions are
specified as either weak or strong. They are semantically
equivalent when used in the policy evaluation, but they differ
in the way that they can be authored by the owners.
Definition 1. A policy p is defined as a tuple (r,A, SC,WC)
where r ∈ R identifies the resource the policy refers to;
A ∈ A is a set of permitted actions on the resource r; SC is
a set of strong conditions and WC is a set of weak conditions
both expressed as logic literals.
Definition 2. A weak or strong condition is a tuple (u, c)
where u ∈ O is a user identifier and is called the author of
the condition and c is a logic literal.
The semantics of the policy authoring are clarified in Sec.
IV-B.
Definition 3. The ownership function o is defined as
o : R → 2O and associates a resource to a set of owners.
For the sake of readability, we show policy p =
(r, {a1, ...am}, {sc1, ..., scn}, {wc1, ..., wcp}) in the following
syntactical representation:
policy p {
strong-conditions:
sc1, ..., scn
weak-conditions:
wc1, ..., wcp
resource: r
can-do: a1, ..., am
}
A. Policy Evaluation
In our approach, all requests to access a resource are
passed to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). This PDP evaluates
the policy for the resource using a knowledge base. This
knowledge base contains properties of the request as well as
information about the social network (such as user groups).
In this paper, we use the Datalog language and its semantics
[11] to specify the policy evaluation semantics for a request.
The use of stratified Datalog semantics enables us to introduce
negation in the policy body.
Datalog has been extensively investigated and used in the
field of access control policies [12], [13] and trust management
[14], [15]. The important property that the policy evaluation
gains is the tractable decidability of the request evaluation.
A consequence of this is that the policy language cannot use
functions.
For the sake of completeness of the presentation, we recall
basic notions of Datalog. The reader is referred to [16] for
more detailed coverage.
A Datalog program P consists of a set of relations R
and a set of rules Q. A relation r ∈ R is a set of n-ary
tuples with n > 1. A ground (positive) literal r(k1, ..., kn)
is true iff the tuple (k1, ..., kn) is in the relation r. A ground
(negative) literal ¬r(k1, ..., kn) is true iff the tuple (k1, ..., kn)
is not in the relation r, which implements the Closed World
Assumption (CWA) implied by the stratified semantics. A
(non-ground) literal can contain variables.
CWA is not usually adopted in trust management languages
[14], [15] due to the problem of credential gathering. Since
our approach follows the typical access control model where
all information needed to make a decision is contained in the
system (in our case the social network information) we find it
appropriate to adopt the CWA.
Rules are of the type h ← b1, ..., bn that intuitively means
that h is true if the literals b1, ..., bn are true. h is called the
head of the rule and is a positive literal, while b1, ..., bn, are
the body of the rule. These body terms are positive or negative
literals or relations over natural numbers (such as =, >).
All variables appearing in the rule are universally quantified
with scope the entire definition and are denoted as upper
case letters. With abuse of notation we use Q to denote the
conjunction of the logic rules in Q. Similarly, R denotes the
conjunction of the relations in R as logic atomic (with empty
body) rules. A query g is true iff it is true in the iterated fixed
point Herbrand model [17] of Q∧R, denoted in this paper as
Q ∪R |= g.
We translate policies into rules that together with a (possibly
empty) set of domain rules B are included in Q. B can be
used to derive views from the relations. For example, rules in
B can define useful abstractions like the definition of active
user (a user that posted at least one comment) or the definition
of common friend. The definition of rules in B and the control
and update of R are under the authority of the social network
management. E includes all the relations relevant to evaluate
the policy.
Given a set of policies S we derive a set
of rules QS that contains for each policy
(r, {a1, ...am}, {sc1, ..., scn}, {wc1, ..., wcp}) a set of
rules:
p′1 ← sc′1 ∧ ... ∧ sc′n ∧ wc′1 ∧ ... ∧ wc′p
...
p′m ← sc′1 ∧ ... ∧ sc′n ∧ wc′1 ∧ ... ∧ wc′p
Atoms in the head correspond to permissions and are
defined as follows p′i = perm(ai, X), where X is a logic
variable that refers to requests and that does not appear in the
rest of the rule. Conditions refer to predicates defined in R or
B. A subset of these predicates REQ has as first argument the
request variable X . Each weak or strong condition ci(k1, ...kn)
is transformed into the logic condition c′i = ci(X, k1, ...kn) if
ci ∈ REQ; otherwise c′i = ci(k1, ...kn).
Definition 4. Given a set of policies S, a set of domain rules
B and a set of relations R, an action t is permitted for a
request q if and only if QS ∪B ∪R |= perm(t, q). The action
is not permitted otherwise. Denied decision is semantically
equivalent to a not permitted decision.
As an example of how policies are transformed into rules
and then evaluated, consider policy p below. The policy states
that the album ‘Birthday party’ can be viewed by users that are
(1) in the ‘Family’ group for Alice and (2) are not “friends
in touch” with Bob (friends that have received at least one
message from Bob).
policy p{
strong-conditions:
request_by(Y),
group(‘Alice’, Y, ‘Family’)
weak-conditions:
not friend_in_touch(‘Bob’, ‘Y’)
resource: ‘Birthday party’
can-do: view
}
As this is the only policy, S = {p}. At some later point in
time, Eva, Alice’s aunt, issues a request to view the Birthday
party album. Eva is close friends with Bob and regularly sends
messages to him. In this case R includes:
request by(r, ‘Eva′).
group(‘Alice′, ‘Eva′, ‘Family′).
friend(‘Bob′, ‘Eva′).
message sent(‘Bob′, ‘Eva′,m).
B includes the following rule:
friend in touch(X,Y )←
friend(X,Y ),message sent(X,Y,M).
One of the predicate symbols in the policy refers implicitly
to the request, i.e. request by ∈ REQ. QS is defined as:
perm(view,X)←
request by(X,Y ),
group(‘Alice′, Y, ‘Family′),
¬friend in touch(‘Bob′, Y ),
Thus, the request r’s action view is not permitted as the
condition friend in touch(‘Bob′, ‘Eva′) is true where the
policy requires it to be false. This means QS ∪ B ∪ R |=
¬perm(view, r).
Note that the weak condition in the example only restricts
the set of users allowed to view the resource. This is a general
feature of the model.
B. Policy Authoring
The authoring of policies addresses two main requirements:
owners have to be able to collaborate on the definition of
the policy; and, each owner of the resource has to be able to
arbitrarily restrict the permissions on the resource.
The policy authoring mechanism is regulated by the follow-
ing rules. Given a policy p = (r, P, SC,WC):
1) A user u can add a weak or strong condition to p iff
u ∈ o(R)
2) A user u can delete a weak condition iff u ∈ o(R)
3) A user u can delete a strong condition (u′, c) iff u′ = u
Owners can freely collaborate on weak conditions but can
also express non-negotiable restrictions on the resource using
strong conditions. A straightforward extension would permit
two different kinds of ownership: one for users entitled to
instantiate strong conditions and another for users only able
to use weak conditions.
C. Condition Conflict Resolution and Malicious Owners
When collaboratively writing a policy, owners may specify
conflicting conditions for the policy. Other work within our
group [18][19] has focussed on policy conflict analysis and
we will use this to detect policy conflicts. We assume that the
conditions are regularly evaluated during the authoring process
to detect such conflicts. Once detected, the authoring process
is halted and all owners involved notified.
If the conflict is due to a co-owner that placed overly
restrictive conditions over content, the other co-owners should
either respect that co-owner’s wishes or modify the content so
that the co-owner is no longer affected e.g., for a photograph
one could blur the co-owner’s face or crop them from the
picture.
Alternatively, the conflict may be caused by a malicious
co-owner purposely sabotaging the policy authoring with un-
reasonable conditions. In this case, we assume such behaviour
can be detected by the resource owner and other co-owners.
This will require support from the policy authoring tool. Once
notified of this malicious behaviour, the owner and co-owners
can then vote to exclude the malicious co-owner from the
policy authoring process. The owner can then restart the policy
authoring protocol and not invite the malicious co-owner to
participate. In following this approach, we assume that (1) a
co-owner’s reasonable concerns for her privacy will not be
interpreted as malicious and (2) the majority of co-owners are
not themselves malicious.
V. SCENARIO
In this section of the paper we present two scenarios. The
first is a motivational scenario highlighting the deficiencies
of existing privacy controls in online social networks. In the
second scenario we introduce our approach and demonstrate
how it can be used to overcome the problems identified in the
first scenario.
A. Motivational Scenario
In the present arrangement used by online social networking
services, users upload digital content which is then available to
other users of the social networking service. Typically, social
networking sites offer only limited restrictions on the viewers
of the content. For example, in Facebook, a user can restrict
viewership to (in order of increasing generality) a sub group
of their friends, all their friends or everyone on the social
networking service.
Currently it is possibly for a person, Alice, to take pho-
tographs of people at a party. She can then upload the pho-
tographs to a social networking service like Facebook, making
them available to everyone. In the process, Alice violates the
privacy of all the people appearing in the photographs. For
this example, we assume that Bob is one of the people in the
photographs. He shares many friends with Alice, and finds the
photographs particularly embarrassing.
B. Scenario with Collaborative Policy Authoring
The application of our technology allows Alice, once she
has uploaded her photographs, to specify privacy policy for the
photographs - in the process, giving her fine-grained control
over who can access the photograph album. She can also create
conditions on access that use context information within the
knowledge base of the PDP, such as a user’s location or time
of a request.
Alice specifies the policy below that states only viewers in
her ‘Friends’ group can view, tag and comment on the ‘Party
Album’ containing the photographs in question.
policy policy1{
strong-conditions:
request_by(Y),
group(‘Alice’, Y, ‘Friends’)
weak-conditions:
resource: ‘Party Album’
can-do: view, comment, tag
}
Alice then nominates Bob and Carol as co-owners of the
album as they appear in most of the photographs. On flicking
through the album, Bob notices several embarrassing pictures.
He adds conditions to the policy to prevent his family members
viewing the album. He also prevents two of his friends, Errol
and Filipo, viewing the album (but only uses weak conditions
as he would prefer them not to see the album, but is willing to
concede access if the other owners think it socially difficult to
block them e.g., if Carol already told them about the party).
As an extra precaution he prevents access to the album when
the requester is inside his house (where his family are likely
to see the photos).
policy policy1{
strong-conditions:
request_by(Y),
group(‘Alice’, Y, ‘Friends’),
not group(‘Bob’, Y, ‘Family’),
request_time(T),
not located_at(Y, ‘Bob’s House’, T)
weak-conditions:
not request_by(’Errol’),
not request_by(’Filipo’)
resource: ‘Party Album’
can-do: view, comment, tag
}
The ‘request time’ predicate in the policy above is needed
to separate out other instances where the requester may have
visited Bob’s house.
Carol edits the policy. She definitely does not want Errol
or Filipo to see the album and so upgrades the corresponding
weak conditions to strong conditions.
policy policy1{
strong-conditions:
request_by(Y),
group(‘Alice’, Y, ‘Friends’),
not group(’Bob’, Y, ‘Family’),
request_time(T),
not located_at(Y, ‘Bob’s House’, T)
not request_by(’Errol’),
not request_by(’Filipo’)
weak-conditions:
resource: ‘Party Album’
can-do: view, comment, tag
}
This new policy is enforced by the social networking service
on all accesses to Alice’s ‘Party Album’.
It should be noted that, while our example is simplistic,
our approach lends itself to the creation of arbitrarily complex
policies. These policies can also refer to domain rules, (such
as the friend in touch rule used in Section IV-A), as well as
information within the knowledge base used by the PDP, such
as time and requester location context information.
The contribution of the work is that the policy was col-
laboratively authored by several people for the purpose of
controlling the disclosure of content on the social network.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the efficacy of the approach we developed
a privacy-aware content sharing application for the Facebook
social networking service, referred to as PRiMMA-Viewer. Our
prototype application enables users to nominate other users of
PRiMMA-Viewer that they consider to be friends. Users can
upload digital content (currently restricted to photographs or
photograph albums) as well as tag and comment on content
belonging to friends.
Uploaded content is not stored on the Facebook server, but
rather on the PRiMMA-Viewer server. Using a server external
to Facebook with our own PDP and PEP enables support
for the potentially complex policies indicated in the paper.
In comparison, Facebook only offers comparatively simple
access control policies. Additionally, use of an external server
circumvents concerns that service providers, such as Facebook,
will use stored content for commercial purposes in the future
and not adequately enforce user-specified access controls (e.g.,
[20]).
As part of the uploading procedure, the uploader of the
content (referred to as the owner) can specify an initial privacy
policy governing access to the content by other users. This
policy controls which users learn about the new content and
the conditions under which users are able to view, comment
on and tag the content.
A screenshot of the application is shown in Figure 1
depicting the central editing window in which this policy
can be written. In our prototype implementation, owners are
required to hand-code their policy. We are currently developing
a user-friendly GUI implementation to simplify the policy
creation and editing process.
As part of our previously outlined collaborative authoring
approach, the owner can also nominate friends to act as co-
owners of the newly uploaded content. These friends are
typically other people the originator believes will be affected
by the disclosure of the content. In the case of photographs,
co-owners could be considered as the other people appearing
in the photograph. These co-owners can edit the policy by
adding or removing conditions.
The PRiMMA-Viewer application is implemented as fol-
lows. It uses the iFrame external application approach in which
Facebook acts as an intermediary between the user and the
application server. In this role, Facebook accepts input from
the user, forwards it to the application server and displays
to the user (possibly sanitized) webpages served up by the
application server. These respective steps are shown as 1, 2, 7
and 8 in Figure 2, which depicts the operation and architecture
of PRiMMA-Viewer.
Within the PRiMMA-Viewer application server, incoming
user requests to view, tag or comment on content are forwarded
to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP evaluates these
requests against policies defined for the affected resources (i.e.
photographs or albums) and determines whether access should
be permitted or denied. The PDP is currently implemented
Fig. 1. Screenshot of the PRiMMA-Viewer application showing the policy authoring screen.
Fig. 2. Architecture of the PRiMMA-Viewer application.
using the Java language IRIS Reasoner3. IRIS was chosen as
it is open source and supports stratified Datalog reasoning.
The decision of the PDP is then passed to the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) where the decision is enforced (e.g.,
access is denied to photo album ”Carol’s Party Album”).
The web server component generates the appropriate webpage
based on what the PEP permits and returns this to Facebook
to display to the user.
VII. FUTURE WORK
The collaborative policy authoring approach we present in
this paper is dependent on the uploader of the content nominat-
ing co-owners with which to author the policy. Currently our
approach assumes this occurs without some external incentive
mechanism. We are examining the use of an incentivised
voting scheme similar to that used by Squicciarini et al. [9]
to overcome this problem.
Related to this issue is the inability of a user to claim co-
ownership of a resource. We do not provide a mechanism
for co-owners to assert ownership over a resource without an
invite as it is difficult to validate such claims. Supporting this
functionality for any type of content is an area of ongoing
research. However, it may be possible with photographs to
use facial recognition technologies to validate a claim of co-
ownership.
An additional area for future work is the development of a
user-friendly policy authoring tool. Currently, our PRiMMA-
Viewer Facebook application provides limited help with au-
thoring policies, requiring users understand the policy lan-
3http://iris-reasoner.org/
guage. We are currently developing a newer version of the tool
to make the collaborative policy authoring process more user-
friendly and accessible to average users of social networks.
This new version will also include the most recent work from
our research group on policy conflict analysis techniques.
At present we have not done any user testing of the approach
to determine user acceptance. We are planning to incorporate
such testing in a larger user trial of our privacy-aware social
networking platform to be performed near the completion of
our research project.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a novel approach to collaborative
policy authoring demonstrated within the context of social
networking. Our approach permits the originators of content
on the social network to specify policies for the content they
upload. The conditions under which the policy applies can then
be edited by nominated users of the social networking service.
These parties represent people interested in the dissemination
of the content. Limitations are enforced on the policy editing
so that the scope of the policy can only be decreased by the
nominated parties.
The approach was implemented in a prototype Facebook
application to demonstrate its efficacy. The application per-
mitted the uploading of content (limited to photographs in the
prototype), specification of policy on that content and then the
shared editing of the policy. Once the policy was finalized, the
application enforced the policy.
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